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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Alston, Elliot 
NYSID: 
DIN: 18-A-0087 
Facility: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Appearances: Dominic Candino Esq. 
1395 Union Road 
Buffalo, New York 14224 
Collins CF 
08-178-18 B 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 
months. 
Board Member(s) Smith, Coppola 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 24, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-S.entence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
T ... e undersigned determine that the dec~sion appealed is hereby: 
--;-:,g.ua~~~~J~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview __ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination !!!!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determ~nation, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the separ~ate ¥ndi119s of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, 1fany, on ~@.:i.l/i tp . 
I I 
Distrib'ution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
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     Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 
Appellant contends all the Board did was to look only at the instant offense/criminal history. 2) 
the decision lacks detail. 3) no aggravating factors exist. 4) the decision lacks future guidance. 5) 
his due process constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release was 
violated. 6) no record of the Board’s deliberations was made. 7) the Board failed to comply with 
the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no TAP was done, the COMPAS was ignored, 
and the statutes are now rehabilitation based. 
 
     Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
    The Board may consider an inmate’s history of drug and/or alcohol abuse.  Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (substance abuse history and risk 
of future drug abuse); Matter of Dean v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 
801 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (3d Dept. 2005) (involvement with weapons and drugs), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 
705, 812 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2006); Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 
(3d Dept. 2005) (history of drug abuse); Matter of Llull v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 
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N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dept. 2001) (drug abuse); Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
236 A.D.2d 760, 761, 654 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (3d Dept. 1997) (history of alcohol and drug abuse); 
Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 
1994) (history of alcohol abuse); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983) (drug addiction); Matter of Maciag v. Hammock, 88 
A.D.2d 1106, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56 (3d Dept. 1982) (problem of alcohol and drug abuse with the 
concomitant need for programmed counseling).  
     The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
     The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry 
plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. 
Dep’t Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate 
release plan). 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
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resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
    The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
    An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d 
Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
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without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.     
     There is no legal requirement that internal deliberations of the Board be on the record.  Borcsok 
v New York State Division of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 962 (3d Dept. 2006). Matter of Collins v 
Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (4th Dept 1983); Matter of Dow v Hammock, 118 
Misc.2d 462, 460 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733; Barnes v New York State Division of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 
1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 639 (3d Dept. 2008). 
    Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). 
    The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
     The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to “Offender Case Plan.”  The 
existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(b).  Accordingly, no further regulation is required.  An Offender Case Plan was prepared for 
Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the interview. Alymer v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, Index No. 218-16, Decision & Order dated Dec. 13, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) 
(McGrath J.S.C.) (inmate’s case plan met requirement of TAP in accordance with Correction Law 
71-a). 
     The COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs 
as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory 
factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that 
the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors 
including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards 
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that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here. 
The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
    The Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight and 
rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and 
planning over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
